University of Avignon, France
*/Information Structures in Complex Queueing Systems/*
Strategic decisions in queueing systems are very common in everyday
life. Rooms in hospitals, voting locations, security gates at
international airports and amusements parks are many examples of systems
for which strategic decisions are taken by each customer in order to
join optimally those systems [1].
The analysis methods and techniques for studying such decision processes
in complex queueing systems are mainly described in the book [2]. An
interesting new aspect of these problems is to study the impact of the
information structure onto the strategic decisions and equilibrium of
the customers. Information about the system like the actual queue length
and/or processing rate is an important parameter for customers who face
the decision whether to join or to choose a particular option/system.
Moreover, customers are not all equal faced to the information proposed.
Some of them can have easily access to the information and some not.
Even, the system manager may aim to hide some information to customers.
A recent paper [3] has shown that some simple policies like giving all
the information or nothing are optimal in some particular cases.
The aim of this project is to extend those results for more complex
structure of the system.
*Backgrounds*: The candidate should have good knowledge in Mathematics,
stochastic models and optimization techniques. Some basic skills in
programming and simulations are also welcomed.
*Starting:*September 1^st 2017.
*Location*: University of Avignon, LIA, France.
*Supervisor:*Professor Y. Hayel, CERI/LIA University of Avignon, France.
yezekael.hayel@univ-avignon.fr
[1] H. Rafael, R.-G. Ricky, /Equilibrium in a two dimensional queueing
game: When inspecting the queue is costly/, Working paper.
[2] R. Hassin, M. Haviv, /To queue or not to queue: Equilibrium behavior
in queueing systems/, Vol. 59, Springer Science & Business Media, 2003.
[3] E. Simhon, Y. Hayel, D. Starobinski, Q. Zhu, /Optimal Information
Disclosure Policies in Strategic Queueing Games/, in Operation Research
Letters, vol. 44, no. 1, 2016.
--
Yezekael Hayel
MCF-HdR/Ass. Prof. with tenure
Directeur du CERI/Department Head
LIA/CERI
Univ. Avignon, France
+33490843536
+33783543150
http://lia.univ-avignon.fr/chercheurs/hayel/
--
Yezekael Hayel
MCF-HdR/Ass. Prof. with tenure
Directeur du CERI/Department Head
LIA/CERI
Univ. Avignon, France
+33490843536
+33783543150
http://lia.univ-avignon.fr/chercheurs/hayel/
**********************************************************
*
* Contributions to be spread via DMANET are submitted to
*
* DMANET@zpr.uni-koeln.de
*
* Replies to a message carried on DMANET should NOT be
* addressed to DMANET but to the original sender. The
* original sender, however, is invited to prepare an
* update of the replies received and to communicate it
* via DMANET.
*
* DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ALGORITHMS NETWORK (DMANET)
* http://www.zaik.uni-koeln.de/AFS/publications/dmanet/
*
**********************************************************
Posts
